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10 Years After the Bust
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Indexes for Mexico Point
To Economic Expansion
An important producer of high-
tech equipment and petrochemicals,
Texas manufacturing is strong. Con-
struction of huge factories, homes
and highways has revived a long-
dormant real estate industry. Banks
are profitable, and Texas remains
a major energy producer.
The great oil price shock of 1986
and the boom that preceded it over-
shadowed many forces that have
been driving Texas’ economic
growth since the turn of the century.
When the bottom fell out of the
energy market, Texas still had a low-
cost business climate, large labor
pool, strategic location, efficient
distribution network and eager high-
tech industry to help rebuild its
economy. These factors stimulated
the state’s economy before the boom
and bust and continue to encourage
growth today.
A Changing Structure
For most of this century, the
Texas economy has been slowly
changing, away from resource-based
industries toward more knowledge-
based industries. This transforma-
tion was put on hold during the
energy boom, when rising oil prices
during the 1970s and early 1980s
encouraged the Texas economy to
shift to profit from the increased
value of one of its abundant natural
resources (Table 1).
Texas has returned to long-run
trends since the bust.
1 Since 1940,
services have played an increasingly
important role both in Texas and
the nation. Technological changes
in agriculture and manufacturing
have raised productivity and held
down prices, allowing consumers
to spend more of their incomes on
services. In the past 10 years, more
than half of Texas job growth has
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n the 10th anniversary of Texas’
sharpest employment decline in
four decades, what appears to be
enduring is the resilience of the
Texas economy. Economic activity
has bounced back with gusto, and
today, after nine years of expansion,
Texas’ employment growth again
ranks among the fastest in the nation.2
ment in that sector has grown more
than in the rest of the country. In the
early 1970s, the share of employ-
ment in the manufacturing sector
was significantly higher in the United
States than in Texas. Since that time,
Texas’ share of manufacturing em-
ployment has become more like
the nation’s by increasing slightly
while U.S. manufacturing employ-
ment was declining rapidly.
One reason Texas’ manufacturing
sector has been increasing relative
to the nation’s is a rapid expansion
of high-tech industries. Texas has
become a leader in the production
of computers, semiconductors and
telecommunications equipment.
2
In fact, Texas has been a leader in
high-tech industries since the 1970s,
boosted by a buildup of defense-
related manufacturing and techno-
logical advances from the oil and
gas industry. The 1980s were diffi-
cult years for high-tech industries,
with defense spending cuts and
global competition pushing down
prices for computer chips.
3 After
the bust, however, Texas high-tech
industries flourished as companies
that were consolidating and down-
sizing moved to Texas, attracted
by a large supply of low-cost land
and labor. In Texas, employment at
high-tech firms has grown twice as
fast as the state’s overall economy
during the past 10 years. The share
of Texas private employment in
high-tech industries has risen from
about 1 percent in the mid-1970s to
3.1 percent in 1994.
4
Texas’ growth in high-tech in-
dustries has been an important
force in helping the state become
more integrated with the global
economy. In 1987, exports contrib-
uted roughly 10 percent of gross
state product (GSP). Today, exports
represent a significant share of
Texas’ economy, contributing roughly
21 percent of total GSP. Texas is a
leading exporter of chemicals, elec-
tronics, computers, transportation
equipment and agricultural prod-
ucts. In 1994, Texas’ $60 billion in
exported goods constituted about
51 percent of the state’s total manu-
facturing sales.
More than 50 countries regularly
purchase Texas products. Texas’
neighbor to the south is its leading
export market. Over the past decade,
exports to Mexico have more than
tripled. Texas’ other major export
markets include Canada, Japan, the
United Kingdom, Taiwan, China,
Singapore, Korea, Venezuela and
the Netherlands.
Reinventing the Energy Industry
While high-tech industries have
been gaining strength, the energy
industry has been rebounding. The
energy industry, while still impor-
tant to Texas, looks very different
from Texas’ energy industry 10 years
ago. Oil and gas extraction output
is about one-third its former size.
Still, Texas continues to be the
nation’s number one combined oil
and gas producer; 26 percent of
the crude oil and 33 percent of the
natural gas produced in the nation
come from Texas. Since 1986, new
technology—including 3-D seismic,
horizontal drilling, coiled tubing and
sophisticated fracturing—has caused
a drop in oil production costs, en-
couraging drilling in places that
were previously cost-prohibitive.
Texas still benefits from rising oil
prices, although the state’s economic
well-being is less tied to oil prices
than it was 10 years ago.
5 During the
1990–91 Persian Gulf war, oil supply
disruptions from the Middle East
sent oil prices to more than $30 per
barrel for several months, helping
push the nation into recession. The
Texas economy avoided recessions
however, thanks to a mini-boom
in oil and gas extraction. The state
remains susceptible to changing oil
prices. Each sustained dollar change
in oil prices changes Texas employ-
ment by about 18,000 jobs.
6
After the oil bust, the state’s energy
industry shifted from upstream oil
and gas extraction industries toward
downstream industries. The 1986
plunge in prices was good news for
the producers of downstream pro-
ducts, which use refined crude oil
and natural gas as inputs.
7 High pre-
Energy
• Oil prices rise in 1973 after OPEC
restricts supplies. By 1981, prices
have surged nearly tenfold to
$37 per barrel.
• In 1982, oil and gas extraction
employment peaks at 5 percent
of Texas’ total, and the industry’s
output peaks at 19 percent of
total gross state product.
Construction and real estate
• The mirage of “$85 in ’85”
oil prices and tax breaks for
apartment and office building
under 1981 tax reforms create
incentives to build with little
regard for demand.
Banking
• Early ’80s banking laws result in
a larger pool of funds to lend.
• Bank portfolios are not geographi-
cally diversified.
• Texas banks number 1,936 before
the bust.
• Oil prices plunge by two-thirds,
from $37 to about $12.
• Within a year, over 50,000
Texas workers lose their jobs.
Another 50,000 jobs disappear
in the aftermath.
• As oil prices fall and tax breaks
disappear, real estate property
values plummet.
• Billions of dollars worth of de-
velopment sit empty for years.
• Some properties are bulldozed
and written off.
• Construction is nil.
• During the 1980s, 368 banks
fail in Texas.
• Of the 10 largest Texas holding
companies, all but one either
failed or was acquired by out-
of-state companies.
Table 1
The Rise, Fall and Resurgence of Key Sectors in the Texas Economy
Boom 1973–85 Bust 1986 Today 1996
• The industry has refocused
toward downstream industries
that use refined crude and
natural gas as inputs.
• Oil and gas extraction jobs
represent about 2 percent of
Texas employment.
• The energy industry contrib-
utes roughly 6 percent of
the dollar value of output.
• Texas real estate market is
much healthier today. Recent
growth is based on the funda-
mental strengths of the Texas
economy.
• Texas banks number 935.
• Bank consolidation has
resulted from the repeal of
Texas unit banking laws and
scale economies from new
technology and interstate
bank combinations.3
bust oil prices had limited demand
and profits for such downstream
products as gasoline, petrochemi-
cals, plastics and rubbers. Lower
prices and a rebounding economy
stimulated demand and led to a
building boom along the Gulf Coast.
Today, the chemical industry
generates one-fourth of Texas’ manu-
facturing shipments and is a leading
export industry. Texas processes
more natural gas than any country
in the world.
8 In fact, the world
price of natural gas liquids is set in
Mont Belvieu, a Houston suburb.
With the nation’s largest refining
capacity, Texas and Louisiana are
the only refining states to export a
significant amount of product to
other parts of the country, particu-
larly the East Coast.
Texas has become a multinational
supplier of oil field equipment and
engineering and construction ex-
pertise. Texas ships oil field equip-
ment and services to help other
countries extract oil and gas. Texas
engineering and construction firms
build major industrial facilities, roads,
highways, airports, hotels and
resorts around the world. In 1994,
four of the top 10 industrial con-
tractors in the world were based
in Texas—Centex, Raytheon Engi-
neers, John Brown/Davy and
Brown & Root—and generated
$11.1 billion in revenues.
9
Construction and Banking
On More Solid Ground10
Just as Texas’ energy industry had
to be reinvented, Texas’ construction
and banking sectors needed to regain
solid footing. Expansion of the
economy in the 1980s went beyond
what the economic fundamentals
could support, pushed by the expec-
tations of higher oil prices and dis-
tortionary tax and banking policy.
In 1982, most analysts expected
that the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) would
keep world oil prices artificially
high and, at the worst, that oil
prices would stagnate around $30
per barrel. Respected forecasters at
Data Resources Inc.
11 and the Uni-
versity of Texas were projecting that
oil prices could reach as high as $60
to $90 per barrel by the year 2002.
12
Analysts put the bottom of their
forecast range around $20 per
barrel and considered that outcome
very unlikely. Forecasters did not
anticipate the surge of cheap oil
that would send prices near $10
per barrel.
13
Distortionary public policy also
encouraged overbuilding. The Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
created tax breaks for apartment
and office building investors, giving
investors and builders incentives to
build without much regard for
demand. At the same time, banking
laws passed in the early 1980s gave
financial institutions a larger pool
of funds to lend investors.
In 1986, falling oil prices and
elimination of tax breaks for real
estate led to massive job losses,
plunging property values and wide-
spread bank failures. Risk-taking
contributed to the severity of the
financial losses. Banks that adopted
relatively risky management strate-
gies in the form of both high reli-
ance on commercial and industrial
loans and construction loans, and
greater use of large certificates of
deposit for funding, suffered much
greater difficulties than did their
more conservative counterparts.
14
Large banks were particularly hard-
hit, suffering greater losses than
small banks.
15 The banking industry
had negative returns on average
assets from 1986 through 1989. In
1989, 65 percent of total U.S. bank
failures were in Texas, and less than
one-fourth of Texas thrifts were both
profitable and solvent. The number
of thrift closures would have been
extremely high, but inadequate
funding of the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)
prevented thrift regulators from
aggressively closing insolvent thrifts
through most of the 1980s.
16
While dreams of $80-per-barrel
oil died quickly, investments made
to chase those dreams were not as
easily liquidated. Although Texas
employment growth began to accel-
erate in 1987, it took several years
for the excess supply of real estate
to be absorbed to the point that real
estate values began to strengthen.
Construction activity continued to
decline throughout the late 1980s.
Today, the Texas real estate market
is much healthier than it was 10
years ago. Recent growth is based
on the fundamental strengths of the
Texas economy.
17 The rebound has
been uneven, however. The ware-
housing industry is strong across
most of the state, but office mar-
kets remain weak in many places.
Although improving, office vacancy
rates in downtown Dallas and
Houston are still among the highest
in the nation.
Return to Trend
When oil prices are relatively
stable, as in the 1990s, Texas eco-
nomic growth is propelled primarily
by the same factors that stimulate
economic growth throughout the
rest of the country. As Chart 2 shows,
Texas employment growth has
been following a pattern similar to
that of the nation’s for more than
five decades. The energy boom
during the 1970s and the bust in
1986 now appear as deviations
from the long-run trend.
Although the pattern is similar,
Texas employment has grown faster
than the nation’s for 43 of the past
55 years. Several factors attract firms
to Texas.
18 Real estate and labor are
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relatively less expensive in the state.
Texas has an efficient distribution
network and is strategically located
in the center of North America, a
factor of increasing importance
since the passage of the North
American Free Trade Agreement.
The oil bust made Texas an even
cheaper destination for expanding
companies, by freeing up labor and
real estate and attracting bargain-
hunting developers.
While Texas employment has
been growing faster than the nation’s,
Texas per capita income has his-
torically been below the national
average. Texas per capita personal
income has been slowly inching
closer to the national average, how-
ever, as shown in Chart 3. In early
1970, before the oil boom, Texas
per capita personal income was
around 88 percent of the national
average. During the oil boom, Texas
per capita income accelerated and
briefly matched the U.S. average,
but then declined in the mid-1980s.
And, in recent years, Texas per
capita income as a percentage of
U.S. income has returned to its long-
run trend rate of growth, increasing
around 0.1 percent per year.
Conclusion
Although the oil bust 10 years ago
will always be an important part of
Texas history, visible signs of this
economic shock are fading. Today,
the mining industry has shrunk. As
Chart 4 shows, oil and gas extrac-
tion has returned to the same share
of employment as in 1972, prior
to the first big jump in oil prices.
Inflation-adjusted oil prices are back
to pre-oil-embargo levels, and the
Texas economy has returned to the
trends that were evident before
rising oil prices sent the economy
skyrocketing.
19 High-tech industries
have accelerated expansion. In-
creased exports have helped Texas
become more of a more globally
focused economy. The service sector
has resumed rapid growth, and
Texas continues to grow faster
than the nation. Although per capita
personal income is below the
national average, Texas is again
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rations, and they have helped
fashion for the United States the
most diverse and rich set of corpo-
rate finance markets in the world.
Firms use short-term finance
markets for working capital pur-
poses, such as financing inventories
or receivables. As shown in Chart 2,
in 1994 short-term business liabili-
ties totaled $1.5 trillion, and they
came from a number of sources, the
most important being loans from
banks. Banks are somewhat unique
among financial institutions in that
they are important lenders to firms
of all sizes. Overall, banks supply
over half of all short-term business
finance. Finance companies are also
important lenders to business, while
other intermediaries also make busi-
ness loans, such as savings institu-
tions and mortgage companies.
Issuing commercial paper is typi-
cally an option only for larger,
more highly rated firms.
Long-term finance markets are
used to finance capital expenditures
that pay back returns over a long
period of time. As shown in Chart 3,
issuance of long-term securities so
far in the 1990s totaled almost $1.2
trillion. Five markets have contrib-
uted to this financing. The most
well-known are the public markets
for bonds and equity. The public
bond market is the largest source of
long-term finance because it caters
to the biggest firms that have the
largest capital needs.
This article will focus on the three
private markets—the private bond,
private equity and angel equity
Chart 2



















The Growth of Corporate Finance
Markets in the United States

















Assets of nonbank financial institutions
Issuance of long-term￿
securities (Right scale)
This article describes and analyzes
the spectrum of finance markets
available to U.S. corporations and
examines how firms as large as
General Motors and as small as the
tiniest start-up get financed, with
particular attention to the recent
dramatic expansion in finance mar-
kets for small and medium-sized
firms. It explores some reasons for
this dramatic expansion. It then
examines why U.S. finance markets
are structured as they are. Finally,
it compares other countries with
the United States in terms of how
their firms obtain financing and
explains why some countries are
now trying to emulate the U.S.
structure.
How Firms in the
U.S. Get Financed Today
As shown in Chart 1, even after
adjusting for inflation, corporate
finance markets have grown ex-
tremely rapidly over the past 15
years. This expansion has largely
been fueled by the rapid growth of
nonbank financial institutions, such
as pension funds, life insurance
companies and mutual funds. In
comparison, commercial banks have
shown steady though less rapid
growth, reflecting in part the regula-
tory constraints on their activities
and the rise of competitors such as
finance companies and money
market mutual funds. Nonbank
financial institutions are now the
major suppliers of funds to corpo-
H
ow an economy channels
finance from savers—typically
individuals—to those with ideas
about how to invest productively—
the business sector—has always
been recognized as important for
economic growth. Some recent
academic work has emphasized this
point. Historians are now attribut-
ing a greater role to the develop-
ment of corporate finance markets
in spurring the emergence of the
railroads and other heavy industries
that were key engines of growth in
the industrial revolution. And some
recent empirical work suggests that
the level of a country’s financial
development helps predict its future
rate of economic growth.
1 Such work
has reignited economists’ interest in
how firms get financed in both the
United States and abroad.
“This article describes and
analyzes the spectrum of
finance markets available
to U.S. corporations and…
explains why some countries
are now trying to emulate
the U.S. structure.”6
markets—because they are the
only realistic sources of long-term
finance for small and middle-market
companies and because they have
grown extremely fast in recent
years. Despite their importance,
relatively little is known about how
these markets operate.
The largest of these private mar-
kets is the private placement, or
private bond, market. It offers long-
term debt at fixed interest rates.
Primary lenders are life insurance
companies. Primary borrowers are
middle-market companies with
annual revenues between $100
million and $500 million that are
generally not large enough to issue
public bonds. Although this market
receives little attention, it has grown
rapidly over the past 15 years and
is now quite large. Average annual
issuance in recent years is almost
five times greater than in the early
1980s, and in some recent years,
issuance has actually exceeded that
of public bonds, even though indi-
vidual issue sizes are much smaller
than those in the public market.
In short, the private placement
market is a major source of funds
for middle-market firms.
2
The private equity market con-
sists of equity investments profes-
sionally managed by specialized
intermediaries, mostly limited part-
nerships. These limited partnerships
are funded by institutional investors
such as pension funds, banks, en-
dowments and insurance compa-
nies. Although this market is small
compared with others, its growth
since 1980 has been astronomic,
almost 10 times faster than other
long-term finance markets. I estimate
that the private equity capital stock
in 1994 was about $100 billion,
almost 25 times larger than in 1980.
3
One reason for this explosive
growth since 1980 has been regula-
tory and tax changes that encour-
aged pension fund investment
through limited partnerships (LPs).
Partnerships have proved to be the
most efficient vehicle for investing
funds from institutional investors
in firms seeking private equity. As
shown on the left of Chart 4, most
of the growth in the private equity
market since 1980 has been through
partnerships. Prior to 1980, private
equity investments were undertaken
mainly by wealthy families, indus-
trial corporations or banks directly
investing their own capital. This
practice was inefficient because it
required all individual investors to
bear the costs of managing their
own investments. The pooling of
funds into one entity—the LP—that
does all the management has proved
to be a more efficient way of orga-
nizing private equity investments.
The right half of Chart 4 shows
that in 1980 this market was focused
almost exclusively on traditional
venture capital targets—small firms,
often in high-tech lines of business
that have a chance of growing into
highly successful large firms. Today,
the market has a much wider range
of activity, including nonventure in-
vestments such as expansion capital
for middle-market firms, turnaround
capital for firms in financial distress
and buyout investments.
Finally, there is the market for
angel capital. Angel capital refers
to equity investments in small firms
by wealthy individuals, often with
entrepreneurial backgrounds. Unlike
the private equity market, this is a
very localized, informal market.
Angel capital is targeted at start-up
or infant stage firms that cannot
attract venture capital because they
don’t have exciting enough growth
prospects. Although it’s hard to
estimate the size of this market, it is
very important for small firms, not
least because it’s often the only
realistic source of capital available
to such firms. The most conserva-
tive estimates suggest that angels
invest about $10 billion in more
than 30,000 small firms each year.
This market has also likely grown
very fast in recent years, in part be-
cause the number of wealthy indi-
viduals in the economy has grown
so fast. For example, after adjusting
for inflation, there are roughly six
times as many people making $1
million or more a year in the U.S.
today than there were in 1980.
Why have the finance markets
for small and medium-sized firms
expanded so rapidly? First, these
firms have become increasingly
important in the economy, as illus-
trated in Chart 5. Per capita new
business incorporations have almost
doubled since the late ’60s, while
Chart 3





















Stock of Private Equity
By intermediary By investment





















the share of total employment in
small firms has increased sharply
since the mid-’70s. The evolution to
an information-based economy has
probably contributed to small firm
growth, since many service and
technology-based firms tend to be
small or medium-sized. The ten-
dency for large firms to outsource
many of their administrative func-
tions to smaller firms (such as pay-
roll, accounting and personnel)
may also be a factor. As small and
medium-sized firms have increased
in importance, so has their demand
for capital. Second, there has been
an increased interest and ability of
institutional investors to supply
capital to smaller firms, as illus-
trated by the previously discussed
pension fund involvement in the
private equity market.
Why Corporate Finance Markets
Are Structured as They Are
Why are corporate finance mar-
kets structured as they are in the
United States? A partial answer lies
in how the finance market has
addressed two generic information
problems faced by all firms trying
to raise capital.
First is the selection problem,
which investors face in choosing
where to invest. Out of the hundreds
of investment proposals investors
receive from firms, how do they
select the ones most likely to suc-
ceed or least likely to fail? A second
problem is one of monitoring or
governance: how do investors ensure
that, after funding, the firm puts the
funds to the proper uses? These are
essentially information problems:
they stem from the fact that poten-
tial outside investors typically know
much less about the firm than the
firm’s managers. This limitation
impairs investors’ ability both to
assess which firms are the best
investments and to know exactly
what the firm is doing with the
money made available to it.
Information problems tend to be
worse for small firms, which do not
produce very detailed information
Chart 5
Small Business Has Been Increasing in Importance





















about themselves and are often too
young to have a track record about
which they can boast. Medium-sized
firms, being typically somewhat
more mature than small firms, have
a more solid track record and tend
to produce more information about
their activities. They consequently
suffer somewhat less from the handi-
cap of the unknown. Large public
firms make available detailed infor-
mation about their activities and
usually have long track records. They
suffer least from such problems.
However, just as firms differ in the
extent of the information problems
they pose to outside investors, cor-
porate finance markets differ in the
extent to which they can deal with
these shortcomings. As shown in
Table 1, small firms are forced to
raise funds in markets that have de-
veloped the greatest safeguards to
mitigate information problems, such
as the markets for angel capital, pri-
vate equity and bank loans. Medium-
sized firms may be able to tap the
private bond market, while some of
the larger or more promising middle-
market firms may also be able to
issue public equity. Large firms that
suffer least from information prob-
lems gravitate toward the markets
that have the fewest such safeguards
and where, in general, capital is the
cheapest, such as the public bond
and commercial paper markets.
What type of safeguards have
markets developed? Two phenom-
ena are common in the bank loan,
private placement, private equity
and angel capital markets. First, as
Table 1
Capital Sources for Firms
Firm size
Small Medium Large
Information availability: Low More High
Selection/monitoring problems: High Less Low
Capital sources: Angel capital
Private equity Private equity
Bank loans Bank loans Bank loans
Private bonds
Public equity Public equity
Public bonds
Commercial paper8
a general practice, investors in
these markets have the expertise
and resources to obtain information
about the firms who solicit them
for money. These investors report
selecting about 1 percent of the
hundreds of investment proposals
they receive per year. Proposals
are usually from firms about which
there is little or no publicly avail-
able information. Thus, banks, life
insurance companies and limited
partnerships have staff capable of
producing information about the
firm from scratch and analyzing that
information intelligently. These re-
sources help mitigate the selection
problem.
Second, investors use their direct
influence or other control mecha-
nisms to ensure that the firm makes
proper use of invested funds. Such
influence helps mitigate the moni-
toring problem. Tight covenants in
bank loans and private placements,
for example, give the firm little lee-
way to stray from the straight and
narrow path.
Private equity investors and angels
also use a number of mechanisms
to gain management influence.
Representation on the firm’s board
and a majority voting right position
are common examples. In addition,
investors typically hold the purse
strings for subsequent capital. Fast-
growing firms depend crucially on
the initial investors to either provide
subsequent capital themselves or
find other investors to do so. Initial
investors will be unwilling to do
either task if they believe the man-
agement team has not performed
up to par. And management almost
always has a significant level of
stock ownership in the firm, so that
management’s incentives are more
aligned with those of the outside
investors.
Chart 6 shows how this structure
of financial markets works in reality,
using the financing history of Dell
Computer as an illustration. Dell,
based in Austin, is currently the
world’s fifth largest personal com-
puter maker, with annual revenues
of almost $3.5 billion. Twelve years
ago, Dell was merely an idea in its
founder’s head. In 1984, Michael
Dell started making and selling IBM
PC clones through the mail from
his college dorm. As with almost
every start-up, his first source of
financing was his own personal
savings. Since the company had
some inventory and sales to which
it could point, for the next three
years Dell tapped bank lines of
credit secured by inventories and
receivables.
By 1987, the company had grown
so fast that it had exhausted its debt
capacity. Given the company’s size
and youth, the only realistic source
of funds was private equity venture
capital. That year Dell convinced a
group of venture capitalists to in-
vest $20 million in the company. As
is typical in venture financings, the
investors wanted some control over
the company in return for their
money—in this case the lead ven-
ture capitalist took the positions of
president and chief operating officer.
The infusion of equity proved
crucial to subsequent expansion,
and by 1988 Dell had become large
enough to raise $28 million from
the public equity markets through
an initial public offering (IPO).
Dell continued to grow fast, and
in 1991 returned to the public equity
market for $120 million. Although
Dell was a successful, fast-growing
company, its relatively small size,
youth and potentially volatile line
of business meant that it still could
not tap the public bond market.
After obtaining a $200 million bank
line of credit in early 1993, Dell had
enough of a track record to be
acceptable to public bond investors
and issued $100 million of public
bonds in August 1993. Thus, in 12
years, and with the aid of a variety
of corporate finance markets, Dell
Computer went from a one-man
operation housed in a college dormi-
tory to a multinational company
that employs over 7,500 people.
International Comparisons
In Japan and Germany, the cor-
porate finance system is very differ-
ent from that of the United States.
Firms in these countries, large and
small, typically have relied much
more on bank financing than have
U.S. firms. The primary reason for
this reliance lies in the heavily
regulated nature of German and
Japanese securities markets, which
has severely stunted their growth.
Their public securities markets are
extremely small compared with
those of the United States, and their
small firm finance markets are even
more undeveloped. For example,
Chart 6
From an Idea to a $3.5 Billion Company in 12 Years…
Dell Computer’s Financing History
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many medium-sized European firms
are now finding it easier to do IPOs
on the U.S. NASDAQ exchange
rather than raise capital domestically.
Although the bank-centered
systems may have had some ad-
vantages in the past, there is an
increasing feeling that such systems
may not provide adequately for the
credit needs of small and medium-
sized firms that are the engine of
future economic growth and inno-
vation. This may be one reason many
of the success stories in the past 15
years have come predominately
from the United States, while there
have been few Dell’s or Microsoft’s
in Japan or Germany. Recognizing
this, policy-makers in these coun-
tries recently have deregulated their
securities markets in an effort to
emulate the U.S. system of corpo-
rate finance.
Conclusion
A recent Business Week cover
article celebrated corporate America’s
access to the public equity markets
and the positive effect the recent
boom in IPOs had for innovation
and growth. The magazine called
this phenomenon “IPO capitalism.”
4
This article argues that the story is
really a much bigger and broader
one. Dell is a success story about
the capacity of U.S. capital markets
to provide funds to firms at all
stages in their life, not just the IPO
stage.
This is not to say that all deserv-
ing firms get the type of access that
Dell enjoyed, nor that our capital
markets could not be improved.
Nor is it meant to imply that it is
now easy for small firms to raise
capital. Raising capital for small
firms is not easy and probably never
will be because of the severe infor-
mation problems that small firms
pose to outside investors. But the
rapid expansion of markets devoted
to solving these problems has made
raising capital easier than it was in
the past. And today there are thou-
sands of firms of all sizes in America
that are benefiting from the unique
scope and breadth of U.S. corporate
finance markets. Such access to
capital deserves a somewhat more
encompassing term than just “IPO
capitalism.”
As Joseph Schumpeter once put
it, “Credit creation is the monetary
complement to innovation.” For
every underlying type of “real”
economy—agricultural, industrial
and so forth—there are a unique
set of financing problems for firms
and an optimal way of addressing
those problems. As American inno-
vation moves us beyond the agrarian
and manufacturing eras and into
the service and information age, our
capital markets must evolve also,
else economic growth will surely
slow. The rapid expansion of the
corporate finance markets for small
and medium-sized firms documented
in this article is one sign that this
evolution is already taking place.
Indeed, U.S. corporate finance mar-
kets today appear to have become
the best in the world at funding
“entrepreneurial capitalism,” what-




1 See R. G. King and R. Levine, “Finance
and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be
Right,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
108 (August 1993): 717–37.
2 See M. Carey, S. Prowse, J. Rea and
G. Udell, “The Economics of the Private
Placement Market,” Federal Reserve
Board Staff Study, no. 166, 1993.
3 See G. Fenn, N. Liang and S. Prowse,
“The Economics of the Private Equity
Market,” Federal Reserve Board Staff
Study, no. 168, 1995.
4 See Business Week, December 18, 1995.10
Beyond the Border
New Business Cycle
Indexes for Mexico Point
To Economic Expansion
clines in the index show that the
economy is in recession.
A composite index of leading
economic indicators aggregates into
one index the movements of series
that generally reflect commitments
or opinions about future economic
activity. Examples of leading indica-
tors include new orders for capital
goods, building permits and busi-
ness expectations.
In constructing the indexes for
Mexico, the economists use tradi-
tional indicators that, in previous
studies, proved to be important
cyclical indicators in many coun-
tries. Other variables specific to the
Mexican economy were also evalu-
ated. All the components included
in the indexes performed well using
a simple set of criteria similar to
that used by the National Bureau of
Economic Research to evaluate com-
ponents of the U.S. leading index.
The selected components of the
coincident index are industrial pro-
duction, insured employment, the
unemployment rate (inverted), real
manufacturing and trade sales, and
an estimate of monthly real gross
domestic product (RGDP). The com-
ponents of the leading index are
average hours worked in manufac-
turing, the real value of construction
structures, an index of real stock
prices, real labor costs (inverted),
net insufficient inventories, the real
peso/dollar exchange rate, the real
oil price and imports of capital goods.
As shown in Chart 1, the leading
index typically turns down prior to
recessions and turns up prior to ex-
pansions. From their analysis of the
performance of the leading index,
Phillips, Vargas and Zarnowitz con-
clude that while volatility reduces
its predictive ability, the leading
index signals business cycle changes
before movements in RGDP or the
coincident index.
The Mexico leading index in-
creased from May through November
1995, while the coincident index in-
creased from July through November
1995 and RGDP increased in the
third and fourth quarters (Chart 2).
The probability that Mexico was in
an economic expansion, based on
changes in the leading index, was
82 percent in August, 92 percent in
September and 97 percent in Octo-
ber and November.
Overall, movements in RGDP and
the composite indexes suggest that
Mexico began an economic recov-
ery in July 1995 that should continue
at least through April 1996. While
economic indicators suggest a recov-
ery is under way, activity is improving
very gradually, especially compared
with the sharp decline experienced
in the first half of 1995.
—Keith Phillips
N
ew composite indexes of lead-
ing and coincident economic
indicators for Mexico suggest that
Mexico began an economic recov-
ery in the second half of 1995. The
indexes were created by Dallas Fed
economists Keith Phillips and Lu-
cinda Vargas, and Victor Zarnowitz,
director of the Center for Interna-
tional Business Cycle Research
(CIBCR) at Columbia University.
A more detailed discussion of the
indexes will appear in the second-
quarter 1996 issue of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic
Review.
A composite index of coincident
economic indicators aggregates into
one index the movements in vari-
ous broad indicators of economic
activity such as output, employment
and income. Movements in the
coincident index reflect the current
state of the economy: growth in the
index signifies that the economy
is expanding, while persistent de-
Chart 2
Mexican Economy Improves
In Second Half of 1995
Index, 1994:1 = 100
Chart 1
Leading Index Anticipates Business Cycle Turns
Leading index, Coincident index, February 1986 = 100
















































FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE DATA
For more information on employment data,
see “Reassessing Texas Employment Growth”
(Southwest Economy, July/August 1993). For
TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial Production Index”
(Dallas Fed Economic Review, November 1989).
For  the Texas Leading Index and its components,
see “The Texas Index of Leading Indicators:
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas Fed
Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s BBS, Fed Flash
(214) 922-5199 or (800) 333-1953, and WWW
home page: www.dallasfed.org
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Texas Employment Total Nonfarm Employment
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
1/96  — — 152.3 421.5 1,038.6 1,461.8 5,064.3 8,138.5 1,796.5 709.5
12/95 111.6 118.9 154.5 421.4 1,035.3 1,461.9 5,072.0 8,145.1 1,788.1 702.1
11/95 111.6 119.0 154.4 418.4 1,032.4 1,459.6 5,046.0 8,110.8 1,788.4 699.5
10/95 112.5 119.6 154.8 415.8 1,030.7 1,455.3 5,025.9 8,082.5 1,788.2 694.8
9/95 113.1 119.6 155.3 411.7 1,031.3 1,453.0 5,011.7 8,063.0 1,791.1 691.5
8/95 113.2 119.9 155.4 408.0 1,029.3 1,458.9 4,989.5 8,041.1 1,775.1 689.1
7/95 113.0 120.0 155.1 405.0 1,026.2 1,449.4 4,965.3 8,001.0 1,774.1 686.2
6/95 112.5 119.3 156.7 407.3 1,028.0 1,445.1 4,962.6 7,999.7 1,772.7 689.5
5/95 112.4 119.1 156.9 406.1 1,027.2 1,441.8 4,957.5 7,989.5 1,762.8 688.1
4/95 111.2 118.8 156.0 401.7 1,029.4 1,440.2 4,941.1 7,968.4 1,757.3 683.4
3/95 110.1 118.7 157.0 404.4 1,032.7 1,435.7 4,939.2 7,969.0 1,759.3 685.7
2/95 111.1 119.1 157.0 405.3 1,030.0 1,432.3 4,928.9 7,953.5 1,753.7 685.6
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
Texas Industrial Production Index
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
Net Contributions of Components to Change In Leading Index,￿
October–December 1995
Thousands of persons Index, January 1981 = 100
Leading index
Employment



























































The Southwest economy made a
healthy showing in 1995, as growth in
all three District state economies out-
paced the national average. Neverthe-
less, District economic activity slowed
from the rapid pace of 1994, a result
of increased labor market tightness, a
weak Mexican economy and a slow-
down in the national economy. Recent
movements in some indicators suggest
a further slowdown in economic growth
in 1996.
District jobs increased at a moderate
2.9-percent pace in 1995, near the
historical-trend rate of growth but
noticeably slower than the 4.3-percent
rate of 1994. The fastest growing in-
dustry in 1995 was construction, which
benefited from firm and employee re-
locations, high-tech expansions and
relatively low mortgage rates. The ser-
vices industry also grew at a healthy
pace last year, aided by robust job
growth at computer-related services
firms and temporary help agencies.
Recently released data suggest the
District economy expanded at a slower
pace in January 1996 because of a
slight employment dip in Texas. The
Texas dip was a result of continued
declines in energy-related employment
and job losses in some service-sector
industries, such as transportation, trade,
real estate and hotels. Anecdotal in-
formation suggests much of the service-
sector job decline is temporary and
does not signal a downward trend.
One sign of strength in the January
numbers was an acceleration in the
growth of manufacturing jobs. The manu-
facturing sector has been boosted in
recent months by strong demand for
electronics and construction-related
products. Also, Texas manufacturing
output has been improving since mid-
1995 and rose faster than the national
average in 1995 as a whole.
The Texas Leading Index was flat in
December after edging down in the
previous three months. Recent move-
ments in the Texas Leading Index sug-
gest a slowdown in the Texas economy
in 1996 from the moderate pace of last
year. Nevertheless, economic growth
should be positive and remain stronger
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In an effort to promote dialog about the role of free enterprise in solving
America’s public policy problems, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas is
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Barbara A. Berger • Barb Tylenda •  Liz Coker • Rev. Ronald T. Marino • Robert B. Aguirre
Richard Freeman • Frank R. Kemerer • Kenneth Siegel • Rev. Theo “Doc” Benson
Dates: April 18–19
Place: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Fee: $120 (fee includes conference materials, reception, dinner, continental breakfast and luncheon)
To register: Call (214) 922-5270 or (800) 333-4460, ext. 5270